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Why are some people wealthy while others are poor? To what extent can governments 
affect inequality? Which instruments should they use? Answering these questions requires 
understanding why people save. Dynamic quantitative models of wealth inequality can help 
us to understand and quantify the determinants of the outcomes that we observe in the 
data and to evaluate the consequences of policy reform. This paper surveys the savings 
mechanisms generated by the transmission of bequests and human capital, by preference 
heterogeneity, by rate of return heterogeneity, by entrepreneurship, by richer earnings 
processes, and by medical expenses. It concludes that the transmission of bequests and 
human capital, entrepreneurship, and medical-expense risk are crucial determinants of 
savings and wealth inequality and that we need to look at more data to measure their 
relative importance.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Why are some people wealthy1 while others are poor? To what extent can governments affect inequality? Which in-
struments should they use? Answering these questions requires understanding why people save. In fact, in many countries 
wealth is much more unequally distributed than labor earnings and income, and the wealthy keep saving at high rates. 
Dynamic quantitative models of wealth inequality can help us to understand and quantify the determinants of the wealth 
outcomes that we observe in the data and to evaluate the consequences of policy reform affecting them.
This survey starts from some basic facts about wealth inequality. It then introduces the workhorse framework for study-
ing wealth inequality, the Bewley (1977) model, which features an incomplete market environment in which people save 
to self-insure against idiosyncratic earnings shocks. In this basic framework, precautionary savings in the face of earnings 
risk are the key force driving wealth concentration. However, since the ability to self-insure improves when wealth is large 
relative to earnings, the nature of precautionary savings implies that the saving rate decreases and then turns negative when 
one’s net worth is large enough relative to one’s labor earnings. Hence, the saving rate of the wealthy is negative in the 
basic Bewley model. In addition, the life-cycle version of the model also overestimates the fraction of people with little to 
* Corresponding author at: University College London, UK.
E-mail address: denardim@nber.org (M. De Nardi).
1 In the interest of readability, we use the terms “wealthy” and “rich” interchangeably.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.06.002
1094-2025/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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high rates, which explains the emergence and persistence of very large fortunes, and the fraction of people with no savings 
at all is relatively small.
Moreover, the basic version of the Bewley model contains very few saving motives and might thus match the savings 
of some people for the wrong reasons. For instance, out-of-pocket medical expenses (including long-term-care) are likely 
an important reason to save for many households, including the upper-income ones. A model abstracting from this risk 
requires more patient agents to match observed net worth. As a consequence, the model might predict that people do not 
value government-provided health insurance because they are patient and do not face health risks.
The survey then discusses previous work that has uncovered forces that, ﬁrst, have been shown to be empirically impor-
tant and that, second, when introduced into a Bewley model, help improve the ﬁt of the wealth distribution. These forces 
include the transmission of bequests and human capital across generations, heterogeneity in preferences, richer earnings 
processes, medical expense risk, heterogeneity in rates of return, and entrepreneurship.
The ﬁrst force, the intergenerational transmission of bequests and human capital, is large in the aggregate economy. 
Hence a natural question is whether it also has important implications for the distribution of wealth, in addition to its 
total amount. It turns out that introducing voluntary bequests of the luxury-good type and transmission of earnings ability 
between parents and children in a Bewley model generates more wealth concentration at the top, because some wealth is 
willingly transmitted across generations by the richer households, who in turn also tend to be higher earners. But, it also 
happens that, when calibrated using a standard earning process, this economy generates too many poor people.
The second force, heterogeneous preferences, has been extensively documented in the empirical literature using a variety 
of methodologies. This mechanism, however, when introduced in a Bewley model, has had limited success in generating 
realistic inequality through the whole wealth distribution. This holds especially true in a life-cycle framework, unless one 
also realistically models bequest motives and the transmission of human capital. This mechanism can thus amplify other 
forces generating wealth inequality rather than being a crucial force driving the bulk of wealth inequality, especially at the 
top end.
The third force is earnings dynamics. Here, too, there is a vast and growing empirical literature documenting that earn-
ings dynamics are much richer than typically assumed in these models. Typical assumptions are that, ﬁrst, earnings follow 
a linear process in which the mean reversion and variance of earnings shocks do not depend on age or earnings levels; and 
second, that earning shocks are log-normally distributed and hence positive, and negative (log-)earnings shocks are equally 
likely. These assumptions are at odds with the data. This matters because suﬃciently high negative skewness in earnings 
shocks can, in principle, generate large wealth concentration at the top. For these reasons, this survey turns to a Bewley 
model that includes an earnings process whose implications are consistent with the data along all of these dimensions. Its 
key ﬁnding is that richer modeling of earnings dynamics helps understand the saving decisions of the bottom 60% of the 
wealth distribution and helps explain the evolution of consumption inequality over the life cycle, but does not generate the 
kind of saving behavior at the top that is necessary to concentrate a lot of wealth in the hands of the richest.
The fourth set of forces that we discuss in this survey are medical expense risk and heterogeneity in life expectancy. 
Here, too, there is convincing evidence that the retirement period is one in which households face large income risk in the 
form of medical expenses and heterogeneous lifespans. In particular, the data show that out-of-pocket medical expenses 
(the portion of medical expenses that people end up paying) increase fast with age and lifetime income after age 80 
and that people with higher lifetime income live signiﬁcantly longer. Introducing out-of-pocket medical-expense risk and 
heterogeneous longevity into a model of savings after retirement helps match wealth holdings by age and lifetime income 
quintiles during retirement and the lack of wealth decumulation that is observed for the high-lifetime-income people even 
at advanced ages. These ﬁndings suggest that medical expenses after retirement are an important reason to save and that 
their role in generating savings and wealth inequality over all of the life cycle should be further studied.
The ﬁfth force, idiosyncratic random shocks to the rate of return to wealth accumulation is a well-known theoretical 
mechanism capable of generating a long right tail in the wealth distribution. Heterogeneity in rates of return has been 
documented to be large empirically, including within asset classes, to be persistent over time, and to be correlated with 
entrepreneurial activity. Life-cycle models with rate of return shocks also require a luxury-good bequest motive to help gen-
erate the observed degree of wealth concentration. In fact, it has been found that luxury-bequest motives are quantitatively 
more important than heterogeneous rates of return. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that rates of return are 
endogenous to entrepreneurial and portfolio decisions and that their determinants should be studied.
The sixth and last force, entrepreneurship, is also supported by strong empirical evidence documenting that: (a) many 
entrepreneurs are rich and a large fraction of rich people are entrepreneurs; (b) entrepreneurs have a high saving rate 
both before and after entry; (c) entrepreneurs face some borrowing constraints. Entrepreneurship is an important way to 
endogenize rates of return by explicitly modeling their production function, borrowing constraints, and risks. The survey 
thus proceeds to analyze the role of entrepreneurship in the context of a Bewley model of inequality. It shows that in 
a model with a simple life-cycle structure, entrepreneurship not only generates realistic amount of wealth concentration 
and wealth mobility over time for both entrepreneurs and workers and a realistic fraction of entrepreneurs among the 
wealthiest, but that it also matches the role of entrepreneurs in hiring labor and employing capital. These ﬁndings thus 
indicate that entrepreneurial activity is an important force driving wealth concentration.
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bequests across generations, entrepreneurship, and medical-expense risks are important determinants of saving and wealth 
inequality. It also argues that a rich model including these forces should be taken to additional data, in addition to wealth 
inequality, to disentangle their relative importance. These additional moments should include wealth mobility, both within 
and across generations, for both entrepreneurs and workers, portfolio composition, the marginal propensity to consume and 
bequeath out of an additional dollar, and the correlation between lifetime earnings and wealth at retirement.
This survey concludes by mentioning other important economic forces that so far have not been examined in the con-
text of quantitative models of wealth inequality and that are potentially important avenues for future research. They include 
modeling the family as a source of both risks (from both partners’ wages and medical expenses and from divorce and death) 
and insurance (including joint savings and labor supply of two partners), endogenizing wages and human capital, endoge-
nizing health, and endogenizing rates of return from assets. Finally, while we mainly have focused on the determinants of 
inequality at a point in time, much more work is needed to understand the dynamics of inequality and its determinants 
over time.
2. Some facts about wealth inequality
Key facts about the distribution of wealth have been highlighted in a large number of studies, including Wolff (1992, 
1998), Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Kennickell (2003), Cagetti and De Nardi (2008), and Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2016).
The most striking aspect of the wealth distribution in the United States is its degree of concentration. Over the past 
30 years or so, households at the top 1% of the wealth distribution have held about one-third of the total wealth in the 
economy, and those in the top 5% have held more than half. At the other extreme, many households (more than 10%) hold 
little in assets. While there is agreement that the share held by the richest few is high, the extent to which it has changed 
over time (and why) is still subject to debate (Piketty, 2014; Saez and Zucman, 2014; Bricker et al., 2015, and Kopczuk, 
2014).
An important related observation is that the concentration of wealth is much higher than that of earnings and income 
(Díaz-Giménez et al., 1997; Rodriguez et al., 2002). For example, in 1992 the Gini indexes for labor earnings, income (inclu-
sive of transfers), and wealth were, respectively, .63, .57, and .78 (Díaz-Giménez et al., 1997), while in 1995 they were .61, 
.55 and .80 (Rodriguez et al., 2002).
In addition, the correlation between labor earnings, income, and wealth is positive, but well below one. Consistent with 
these ﬁndings, Hendricks (2007b) ﬁnds that the correlation coeﬃcient between lifetime earnings and wealth at retirement 
(0.61) is much less than unity.
Several studies have documented signiﬁcant differences in saving behavior across various groups that might help shed 
light on the above facts. (See Browning and Lusardi, 1996 for a review of the literature.) In particular, Dynan et al. (2004)
ﬁnd a strong positive association between lifetime income and saving rates in U.S. data. De Nardi et al. (2010) show that, 
among the elderly, people with higher lifetime income not only reach retirement with more wealth, but also run down their 
net worth more slowly during the retirement period. They also show that the patterns of out-of-pocket medical spending 
help to account for the high wealth holdings of higher-income people during retirement. Quadrini (1999) documents that 
entrepreneurs, who tend to be among the richest households, exhibit higher saving rates. Buera (2006, 2009) ﬁnds high 
saving behavior for entrepreneurs, both before and after entering entrepreneurship, thus indicating that people might save 
to both enter and expand their business.
Beyond cross-sectional inequality at a point in time, the degree of mobility within the earnings and wealth distributions—
the extent to which rich households stay rich and poor households stay poor—is an additional important dimension. Hurst 
et al. (1998) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to analyze wealth mobility between 1984 and 1994 and doc-
ument that most of the mobility occurs in the mid-range deciles, while the top and bottom ones show high persistence. 
Using the same dataset, Quadrini (1999) studies the wealth mobility for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and ﬁnds that 
entrepreneurs are more upwardly mobile. Unfortunately, top-coding in the PSID does not provide a very accurate picture 
of what happens in the top percentiles. Progress has been made by Guvenen et al. (2015a) by analyzing administrative tax 
data for earnings in the U.S.
These facts not only help inform about potential saving motives, but also help discipline their strength and dynamics over 
time. At least a subset of these facts will be used in turn, together with other facts, to discipline each of the quantitative 
models that we now analyze.
3. Basic Bewley models, saving behavior, and wealth inequality
Bewley models are incomplete-market models in which households are usually ex-ante identical,3 in the sense that they 
face the same stochastic process for an endowment shock, but are ex-post heterogeneous, because they receive different 
2 See also Krueger et al. (2016).
3 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for an overview of Bewley models (sometimes also called Aiyagari–Bewley–Huggett–I˙mrohorog˘lu models), including 
properties and solution methods. See Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) for a discussion of why we need incomplete-market models to study wealth inequality.
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A Bewley model with inﬁnitely-lived agents. Data from the 1989 Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) in the top line of data and corresponding simu-
lated models in the bottom two lines of data, as reported by Quadrini and 
Ríos-Rull (1997).
Wealth Gini Wealth in top (%)
1% 5% 20%
U.S. data, 1989 SCF
.78 29 53 80
Aiyagari Baseline
.38 3.2 12.2 41.0
Aiyagari higher variability
.41 4.0 15.6 44.6
sequences of shock realizations. An exogenously speciﬁed earnings process is typically the source of these shocks, and its 
properties are usually estimated from micro-level data on earnings. Aiyagari (1994) and Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992)
provide early general-equilibrium versions of Bewley models.
Formally, the canonical Bewley model features a population of agents maximizing expected utility over the remaining, 











at+1 = (1+ r)at + yt − ct, at+1 ≥ a,
where ct denotes consumption at age t , at the asset stock, yt the realization of the stochastic labor earnings, and r the 
return to the single risk free asset. The probability that the household survives to period t is St,h =∏t−1l=h sl , where sl is the 
survival probability between age l − 1 and age l. In each period t , the household allocates total resources between current 
consumption and next period’s assets, subject to the borrowing limit a. Labor earnings are usually assumed to follow a 
ﬁrst-order Markov process.
While computing the transitional equilibrium dynamics is sometimes feasible, these models are often solved for station-
ary equilibria. Since it is assumed that there is no aggregate uncertainty, in a stationary equilibrium there is a constant 
distribution of people over state variables. However, individuals face considerable uncertainty as they move up and down 
the distribution.
These models endogenously generate differences in asset holdings as a result of the household’s desire to save and the 
realization of the exogenous shocks. Incomplete-market models can be applied to study many interesting and important 
questions that go beyond wealth inequality and, thus, the scope of this survey. See Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2014), Krusell 
and Smith (2006), Guvenen (2016), and Heatcote et al. (2009) for surveys on this, and Conesa et al. (2009), Krueger and 
Fernandez-Villaverde (2011), and Krueger et al. (2017) for interesting applications.
3.1. The inﬁnitely-lived Bewley model
In the inﬁnitely-lived case, the probability of survival st is identically equal to one and the stochastic process for earnings 
is time-independent. A version of this model is quantiﬁed by Aiyagari (1994), who assumes that (log) yearly labor earnings 
follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, with an autocorrelation of 0.6 and a standard deviation of innovations of 0.2. This 
results in an unconditional coeﬃcient of variation of 0.31.4 Aiyagari also considers a process with twice the standard devia-
tion of the innovation for earnings, which results in an unconditional coeﬃcient of variation of 0.63; this is a much higher 
variability process than typically estimated in the literature. Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) summarize the implications of 
the model for these two parameterizations of the earnings process.
Table 1 reports their ﬁndings for the wealth distribution. The ﬁrst row refers to data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF). The second and third rows report the corresponding moments for respectively the baseline calibration and 
the one with higher earnings volatility in Aiyagari (see Quadrini and Ríos-Rull, 1997). The comparison makes clear that this 
version of the model comes nowhere near to matching the Gini coeﬃcient, let alone the degree of wealth concentration 
among the top 20% or less of individuals. For instance, the richest 1% of people in these versions of the model hold, at most, 
4% of total net worth, compared with 29% in the data, and the Gini coeﬃcient generated by the model is half the one in 
the data.
4 These ﬁgures are based on estimates from Abowd and Card (1989) using micro-level panel data.
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Percentage wealth in the top Percentage with 
wealth negative 
or zero wealth
1% 5% 20% 40% 60%
1989 U.S. data
.60 .78 29 53 80 93 98 6
A basic overlapping-generations Bewley model
.67 .67 7 27 69 90 98 17
3.2. A basic overlapping-generation Bewley model
The inﬁnite horizon Bewley model does not account for the heterogeneity that arises from the life cycle, which is an 
important source of heterogeneity in wealth because people typically enter the labor market with little to no assets and 
then gradually accumulate them, at least until retirement age.
To introduce a life-cycle dimension, assume that in each period a continuum of agents are born. Each agent lives at most 
T periods and faces an age-dependent survival probability st . Surviving agents work up to age L < T and retire afterwards. 
The demographic patterns are assumed to be stable, hence age-t agents make up for a constant fraction μt of the population 
at every point in time.
The earnings process is now age-dependent. During the working period, it is composed of a deterministic component, 
which is hump-shaped by age, and a stochastic component, which is a ﬁrst-order Markov chain. During retirement, it equals 
a constant Social Security beneﬁt.
There are no annuity markets5 to insure against mortality risk. People who die prematurely leave accidental bequests, 
which are redistributed uniformly among all people alive. Compared with the previous framework with inﬁnitely-lived 
agents, two more saving motives are present: to smooth consumption during retirement and to self-insure against longevity 
risk.6 In principle, these additional saving motives could generate more wealth inequality and higher saving rates than in 
the model with inﬁnite lifetimes.
Huggett (1996) calibrates this model economy to key features of U.S. data and uses different versions of it to quantify 
how much wealth inequality it can generate.
Table 2 compares wealth moments from the data and a calibrated version of Huggett’s model. The ﬁrst row refers to 
the 1989 U.S. data. The second one refers to De Nardi’s (2004) version of Huggett’s model7 with only accidental bequests. 
Compared with the inﬁnite-horizon model, Huggett’s model economy succeeds in matching the U.S. Gini coeﬃcient for 
wealth, but the concentration is obtained by having too many people holding little wealth, rather than by concentrating 
enough wealth in the right tail of the wealth distribution.
The key reason for this failure is that in the data, the rich have a high saving rate, while in the model, households stop 
saving once they have accumulated a suﬃciently high buffer-stock (Carroll, 1997) and retirement saving. This is illustrated in 
Fig. 1, which reports the saving rate as a function of current wealth for an individual with median earnings (corresponding 
to $32,000 in the model, expressed in year 2000 $) at different ages. Even for individuals close to retirement, the target 
level of wealth does not exceed ten times current earnings. Thus, the additional saving motives in this version of the model 
(saving for retirement and for longevity risk) help bring the implications of the model closer to the data, but do not go far 
enough in that direction, as they do not suﬃciently raise the saving rate of people as they get richer.
Huggett also ﬁnds that relaxing the household’s borrowing constraint increases the fraction of people bunched at zero 
or negative wealth, but does not increase much the asset holdings of the rich. Hence, it does not help in generating a 
distribution of wealth closer to the observed one. In addition, he documents the amount of wealth inequality generated by 
his model at different ages and shows that, starting from age 40, the model underpredicts the amount of wealth inequality.
To sum up, this class of models is not capable of explaining why rich people keep saving at high rates. In particular, it 
implies that, to the extent that earnings follow a canonical (log-) linear process (e.g. Abowd and Card, 1989), the right tail 
of the wealth distribution cannot be thicker than that of the distribution of earnings. As discussed above, this is at odds 
with the empirical evidence that wealth is substantially more concentrated than earnings.
3.3. Lessons learned from the basic quantitative Bewley model
The two previous subsections thus show that both the inﬁnite-horizon and the life-cycle versions of the Bewley model 
do not match well the observed distribution of wealth. In particular, while the life-cycle version improves the ﬁt of the 
5 This is a commonly used assumption because the annuity market is small in practice. Eichenbaum and Peled (1987) show that in the presence of moral 
hazard, people will choose to self-insure rather than use annuity markets, even if the rate of return on annuities is high.
6 For the same reason, modeling Social Security explicitly is important because Social Security redistributes a signiﬁcant fraction of income from the 
young to the old and, thus, reduces the saving rate and changes the aggregate capital-output ratio.
7 These results are very similar to Huggett’s, though they refer to a model period of ﬁve years. We report this version for easier comparability with the 
results on the transmission of bequests and human capital. The length of the time period is the main reason why these results are slightly different from 
those in the benchmark in De Nardi et al. (2016), which uses a one-year model period.
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(For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
wealth Gini coeﬃcient, it does so by generating rich people who are not nearly rich enough, middle-class people who are 
too rich, and poor people who are too poor compared with the actual data.
A number of empirically important economic forces have been included in the basic Bewley setup to assess the extent 
to which they improve its ability to match the observed wealth inequality. Because saving behavior depends on preferences 
and the accumulation technology implied by the dynamics budget constraint (more speciﬁcally, non-capital earnings risk 
and the rate of return on wealth), we classify the economic forces considered into these two components of the model in 
what follows.
4. Bequests and transmission of human capital
Intergenerational transmission of wealth is empirically important. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) argue that it accounts 
for the majority of aggregate capital formation. Further studies have found that intergenerational transfers account for at 
least 50–60% of total wealth accumulation Gale and Scholz (1994)8 Given that intergenerational transfers are large in the 
aggregate, they might also play an important role in shaping wealth inequality.
On the theory side, Becker and Tomes (1979) were the ﬁrst to model the parental decision problem and to characterize 
the transmission of both human capital and bequests across generations. They showed that in the presence of borrowing 
constraints, parental transfers ﬁrst come in the form of children’s human capital investment; and that only after the opti-
mal amount of human capital investment in children has been achieved, parents ﬁnd it optimal to start giving monetary 
transfers, such as bequests. Bequests are thus a luxury good in this framework.
Further developing these ideas in a quantitative framework, De Nardi (2004) introduces two types of intergenerational 
links in the OLG model used by Huggett: voluntary bequests and transmission of human capital. She models the utility 
from bequests as providing a “warm glow” (as in Andreoni, 1989) and the transmission of human capital as the correlation 
between children’s labor earnings at labor market entry with parent’s labor earnings at the same time. In this framework, 
parents and their children are thus linked by voluntary and accidental bequests and by the transmission of earnings ability. 
The households thus save to self-insure against labor earnings shocks and life-span risk, for retirement, and possibly to leave 
bequests to their children. Thus, this version of the model changes both preferences and technology (and more speciﬁcally 
the endowment).
More speciﬁcally, compared with the standard Bewley model, the voluntary “warm glow” bequest motive introduces an 










1− σ + (1− st+1)φ(b(at+1))
)
at+1 = (1+ r)at + yt − ct, at+1 ≥ a
8 Wolff and Gittleman (2014) and Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2016) suggest somewhat smaller numbers, but it is well known that the exact way that this 
number is computed in important. See Davies and Shorrocks (2000).
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Percentage wealth in the top Percentage with 
wealth negative 
or zero wealth
1% 5% 20% 40% 60%
1989 U.S. data
.60 .78 29 53 80 93 98 6
No intergenerational links, equal bequests to all
.67 .67 7 27 69 90 98 17
No intergenerational links, unequal bequests to children
.38 .68 7 27 69 91 99 17
One link: parent’s bequest motive
.55 .74 14 37 76 95 100 19
Both links: parent’s bequest motive and productivity inheritance







captures the utility of bequeathing b(at+1), where the function b(·) maps the parent’s wealth at death into the bequest, 
net of estate taxes, received by the offspring. The utility from leaving bequests depends on two parameters: φ1 , which 
represents the strength of the bequest motive, and φ2, which measures the extent to which bequests are a luxury good 
because it affects the marginal utility of bequests in a nonlinear way.9 These two parameters are respectively calibrated to 
data on the fraction of capital due to intergenerational transfers and the 30% share of singles that leave estates of little or 
no value.
It should be noted that some papers that do not ﬁnd evidence in favor of a bequest motive (e.g. Hurd, 1989; Hendricks, 
2004) assume that utility is homothetic in bequests (φ2 = 0), thus generating the counterfactual implication that even poor 
people save to leave bequests of signiﬁcant size. In addition, Hurd (1989) identiﬁes a low marginal propensity to leave 
bequests by comparing the asset trajectories of households with and without children, and we now know that people 
without children also want to leave bequests (Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). In contrast, looking at a sample of wealthier 
retirees, Laitner and Juster (1996) ﬁnd that about half of the households in their sample plan to leave estates and that the 
amount of wealth attributable to estate building is signiﬁcant, accounting for half or more of the total for those who plan 
to leave bequests.
De Nardi’s ﬂexible functional form and parameterization imply a realistic distribution of estates. Her calibration is also 
quantitatively consistent with the estimates of the elasticity of the savings of the elderly to permanent income by Altonji 
and Villanueva (2003).
Table 3 summarizes De Nardi’s main results. The ﬁrst two rows, reported for convenience, are the same as in Table 2
and refer, respectively, to the 1989 SCF U.S. data and the version of Huggett’s model economy with only accidental bequests, 
redistributed uniformly in every period. The third row refers to an economy in which there are only accidental bequests 
that, rather than being redistributed uniformly, are received by the children of the deceased only once, upon their parent’s 
death. This formulation implies that bequests are both unequally distributed and received at a realistic age, rather than 
every period).
Comparing rows two and three reveals that allowing for a more realistic timing and distribution of accidental bequests 
does not generate a more unequal wealth distribution. This is because receipt of a bequest per se does not alter the saving 
behavior of the richest. On the other hand, the timing of transfers does signiﬁcantly affect the transfer-wealth ratio in 
the ﬁrst column of the table. The transfer-wealth ratio—the ratio of wealth transmitted across generations to aggregate 
capital—is a measure of intergenerational transfers ﬁrst proposed by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). The ratio is sensitive 
to the timing of transfers because of the way that transfers are capitalized and accumulated interest accrues to bequests. 
If children inherit only once, when their parent dies (rather than every year), then the fraction of wealth attributed to 
intergenerational transfers in the model is much lower than the one in the data.
The fourth row in Table 3 allows for a voluntary bequest motive and shows that voluntary bequests can explain the 
emergence of large estates, which are often accumulated in more than one generation and are important for the upper tail 
of the wealth distribution in the data. The bequest motive to save is much stronger for the richest households, who, even 
when very old, keep some assets to leave to their children. The rich leave more wealth to their offspring, who, in turn, tend 
to do the same. In steady state, this behavior generates some large estates that are transmitted across generations because 
of the voluntary bequests.
9 See De Nardi (2004) for more discussion on this.
M. De Nardi, G. Fella / Review of Economic Dynamics 26 (2017) 280–300 287Fig. 2. Age proﬁle of average wealth for .1, .3, .5, .7, .9, .95 quantiles. No links, equal bequests to all, panel (a), and bequest motive, panel (b). From De Nardi 
(2004).
The ﬁfth row allows for both voluntary bequests and transmission of ability and shows that a human-capital link through 
which children partially inherit the productivity of their parents generates an even more concentrated wealth distribution. 
More productive parents accumulate larger estates and leave larger bequests to their children, who, in turn, are more 
productive than average in the workplace.
Therefore, a luxury-type bequest motive can help to explain why rich households save at much higher rates than the 
rest (Dynan et al., 2004).10 As shown in Fig. 2, the presence of a luxury-type bequest motive also generates lifetime saving 
proﬁles that imply slower wealth decumulation in old age for richer people, consistent with the facts documented by De 
Nardi et al. (2010), using micro-level data from the Health and Retirement Survey.
In a model with intergenerational links that abstracts from medical-expense risk, saving for precautionary purposes and 
saving for retirement are the primary factors for wealth accumulation at the lower tail of the distribution, while saving to 
leave bequests signiﬁcantly affects the shape of the upper tail.
This model also has implications for wealth heterogeneity at retirement. Venti and Wise (1998) and Bernheim et al. 
(2001) show that wealth is highly dispersed at retirement, even for people with similar lifetime incomes. Bernheim et al. 
(2001) argue that the observed differences are hard to explain in the context of a model with rational agents and are, 
in contrast, better explained by “rule of thumb” or “mental accounting” behavior. A few papers further investigate the 
implications of models with rational agents along these dimensions. Hendricks (2004) studies the implications of a basic 
OLG model with accidental bequests and shows that, at retirement age, the model overstates wealth differences between 
earnings-rich and earnings-poor households, while it understates the amount of wealth inequality conditional on lifetime 
earnings. In contrast, de Nardi and Yang (2014) show that, when augmented with voluntary bequests and intergenerational 
transmission of earnings, the OLG model can match the observed cross-sectional differences in wealth at retirement and 
their correlation with lifetime incomes.
Gokhale et al. (2001) also account for wealth inequality at retirement in an overlapping-generations model with inﬁnite 
risk aversion, only accidental bequests, and a rich set of exogenous features (death and fertility, assortative mating, and 
heterogeneous human capital and rate of return). In their environment, skill differences, assortative mating, Social Security, 
and time preferences are the primary determinants of wealth inequality at retirement.
4.1. Interesting potential extensions
The papers by De Nardi (2004) and de Nardi and Yang (2014) thus highlight some important mechanisms that are not 
only empirically relevant, but also help reduce the gap between the implications of the standard life-cycle Bewley model 
and observed wealth inequality. However, the framework that they adopt has a number of limitations and could thus be 
extended further.
First, it takes the transmission of human capital, or individual productivity, as exogenous. There is a vast literature on 
the endogenous transmission of human capital, but not on its implications for inequality in wealth holdings. For instance, 
Aiyagari et al. (2002) study optimal parental investment of time and money in children, both with perfect and imperfect 
altruism. Brown et al. (2011) develop a model in which parents and children make heterogeneous investments in chil-
dren’s education, and some parents underinvest in it. Lee et al. (2014) study the importance of parental investment on 
the intergenerational transmission of economic status, while Lee and Seshadri (2014) attempt to identify the causal effect of 
10 An effectively isomorphic mechanism is Carroll’s (2000) “capitalist spirit” model, in which ﬁnitely-lived consumers have wealth in the utility function, 
which can be calibrated to make wealth a luxury good, thus generating nonhomothetic preferences.
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Second, the framework assumes that fertility is exogenous and that everyone has the same number of children. Scholz 
and Seshadri (2007) examine the effects of children in a life-cycle model with endogenous fertility. They argue that chil-
dren have a large effect on household’s net worth and consequently are an important factor in understanding the wealth 
distribution. They also ﬁnd that fertility and credit constraints interact in ways that signiﬁcantly affect wealth accumulation.
Third, there are no inter-vivos transfers between parents and children. Nishiyama (2002) adopts an OLG model with 
bequests and inter-vivos transfers in which households in the same family line behave strategically. Like De Nardi, he 
concludes that the model with inter-vivos transfers helps explain some of the large fortunes that are observed in the 
data, thus conﬁrming that transfers across generations before and after death have similar implications in terms of wealth 
inequality.
Fourth, one might think that if households’ voluntary bequest motives are an important reason why rich households keep 
saving, the speciﬁc bequest formulation might be quite important in determining the response to taxation. Interestingly, De 
Nardi and Yang (2015) ﬁnd that, regardless of whether warm-glow bequests of the type that we have discussed in this paper 
depend on estates net or gross of taxes, the model does not generate very different responses to estate taxation reform as 
long as the models are calibrated to match the same facts. More investigation on the robustness of this result to different 
policies and formulations of the bequest motives is called for.
5. Preference heterogeneity
There is enough micro-level empirical evidence of heterogeneity in time preferences (Lawrence, 1991) and both time 
preferences and risk aversion (Cagetti, 2003) to suggest that preference heterogeneity might be a plausible avenue to help 
explain the vastly different amounts of wealth held by households in the data.











in which both the discount factor βi and the risk-aversion coeﬃcient σi are speciﬁc to individual i and may evolve stochas-
tically.
Krusell and Smith (1998) extend the inﬁnitely-lived version of the Bewley model by introducing a stochastic process for 
each dynasty’s discount factor, implying it changes on average every generation. They keep, instead, risk aversion constant 
and homogeneous across dynasties. They show that a small degree of stochastic heterogeneity in discount factors allows the 
model to match the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and generates more wealth concentration among 
the richest. However, while capturing the variance of the wealth distribution well, their model and calibration fall short of 
matching the large wealth concentration at the top 1% (24% in the model, compared with 28–33% in the data, depending 
on the reference year).
Hendricks (2007a) studies the effects of stochastically evolving, discount factor heterogeneity in a life-cycle, rather than 
dynastic, framework with purely accidental bequests. To discipline preferences, he requires that his model matches the ob-
served age pattern of the wealth Gini coeﬃcient that he estimates from the data. After matching these calibration targets, 
he examines the model’s implications for the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. Contrary to the inﬁnite-horizon setup of 
Krusell and Smith (1998), he ﬁnds time-preference heterogeneity makes only a modest contribution to accounting for the 
observed high wealth concentration. This result obtains despite the fact that, in his life-cycle model, the degree of hetero-
geneity in discount factors chosen to match the age-proﬁle of the wealth Gini coeﬃcients is much higher than in Krusell 
and Smith (1998). In addition, the implied gap between the discount factors of the most and least patient households is 
more than twice the corresponding gap estimated by Lawrence (1991), using consumption Euler equations across permanent 
income levels.
Hendricks (2007a) argues that the difference in results between the inﬁnitely- and ﬁnitely-lived formulations is due 
to the fact that the presence of an additional (retirement) saving motive implies that, for the same parameter values, 
the life-cycle model implies a higher wealth-income ratio than the dynastic model. Therefore, if one denotes by βi(1 + r)
the effective degree of impatience, its average value consistent with a standard wealth-income ratio target of 2.5–3 is 
close to one in a dynastic model, but substantially below one in a life-cycle model. As a result, for any sensible degree of 
discount rate heterogeneity, the impatience condition – βi(1 + r) < 1 – guaranteeing a ﬁnite target for the ratio of wealth 
to permanent income holds for all agents in a life-cycle model. And, vice versa, in a dynastic model, the same degree of 
heterogeneity, combined with a substantially higher average, implies that βi(1 + r) > 1 for the most patient individuals. The 
violation of the impatience conditions (or equivalently the fact that they have an inﬁnite wealth-income target) explains 
why the most patient individuals accumulate large amounts of wealth in the dynastic model.
Recent work by Paz-Pardo (2016) conﬁrms Hendrick’s ﬁndings in the context of a standard life-cycle model, but also 
shows that, in combination with a luxury-type bequest motive and productivity inheritance as in De Nardi (2004), an empir-
ically reasonable level of preference heterogeneity can help explain wealth concentration among the top 1% of non-business 
owners, while still generating a life-cycle increase in average consumption consistent with the data.
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Castañeda et al.’s (2003) earnings process.
Earnings level 1.0 3.0 10.0 1060
Fraction at invariant distribution 61.11% 22.25% 16.50% 0.04%
Heer (1999) adopts a model in which richer and poorer people have different tastes for leaving bequests to generate 
heterogeneity in wealth holdings, while Laitner (2001) assumes that all households save for life-cycle purposes but that 
only some of them are altruistic toward their children. Laitner allows for perfect annuity markets, therefore all bequests 
are voluntary, and there is no earning risk over the life cycle, hence no precautionary savings. In addition, he matches the 
concentration in the upper tail of the wealth distribution by choosing both the fraction of altruistic households and the 
distribution of wealth within the dynasty (which is indeterminate in the model).
More in the spirit of experimenting with the formulation of preferences, rather than of allowing for preference hetero-
geneity, Díaz et al. (2002) study the effect of habit formation and ﬁnd that it actually decreases the concentration of wealth 
generated by this type of model. In fact, habits act similarly to increased risk aversion, and more risk aversion tends to 
increase the saving of everyone and to dampen wealth dispersion.
5.1. Interesting potential extensions
In sum, previous work indicates that preference heterogeneity, and especially patience heterogeneity, can generate 
increased heterogeneity in wealth holdings to some extent. However, it is diﬃcult to determine how much preference het-
erogeneity it is reasonable to incorporate in a model and whether we are overstaing the role of this factor. More generally, it 
would be interesting to deepen the previous analysis by allowing for richer formulations of the utility function in which, for 
instance, risk aversion and intertemporal substitution do not have to coincide (see Wang et al., 2015, for some interesting 
ﬁndings on this) and for merging this source of inequality with other explanations generating inequality in wealth holdings, 
to better evaluate its importance in conjunction with others.
6. Earnings risk
The modeling of the earnings process has to do with the kind of technology (the endowment, more speciﬁcally) that is 
assumed in a Bewley model. The standard assumption in quantitative models of wealth inequality is that (log) labor earnings 
follow an age-independent linear process with homoskedastic Gaussian innovations around a deterministic age-eﬃciency 
proﬁle. It should be noted that the age-independent linearity assumption implies that the mean reversion of a shock is 
constant by earnings levels and age.
Yet, Arellano et al. (2017) ﬁnd that the persistence of earnings innovations depends both on age and previous earnings 
level; Geweke and Keane (2000) and Bonhomme and Robin (2009) document that innovations to earnings are not Gaussian; 
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell et al. (2015) show that innovations to earnings are not homoskedastic; and 
Guvenen et al. (2015b) highlight that earnings changes display substantial negative skewness and kurtosis and that the 
conditional moments of earnings changes display substantial variation by age and previous earnings level.11
Castañeda et al. (2003) were the ﬁrst to highlight how a stochastic process featuring negative skewness may help gen-
erate a long right tail in the wealth distribution. They consider a model economy with a two-stage life cycle (working 
time and retirement), in which workers have a constant probability of retiring in each period, and retirees face a constant 
probability of dying. Each household is perfectly altruistic toward its descendants.
The key feature of their model that generates a large amount of wealth holdings in the hands of the richest is the 
productivity shock process, whose key features are reported in Table 4. This process is calibrated to match features of both 
the earnings and wealth distributions in the United States. The calibration implies that the highest productivity level is more 
than 100 times higher than the second highest. Thus, there is a large discrepancy between the highest productivity level 
and all of the others. Moreover, an individual with the highest productivity level has a more than 20% chance of being 100 
times less productive during the following period. High-earning households thus face higher earnings risk and save at high 
rates to self-insure against this risk. As a result they accumulate a large buffer stock of assets. This ﬁnding implies that an 
earnings process displaying suﬃciently large negative skewness at the top end is capable of generating a long right tail in 
the wealth distribution.
Importantly, the properties of this earnings process are calibrated to match cross-sectional moments of the earnings and
wealth distributions, rather than using household-level data on earnings dynamics over time. This was a forced choice at 
the time the paper was written because the panel data sets available at the time (e.g., the PSID) were not representative 
of earnings risk for the richest individuals, due to top coding and lack of oversampling at the top. The recent availability 
of large panel data sets that do not suffer from these shortcomings raises the question of whether the degree of negative 
skewness in actual earnings data is large enough to generate the observed levels of top wealth concentration.
11 Guvenen et al. (2015b) document these features using U.S. Social Security Administration tax earnings (W2) data, while Arellano et al. (2017) use 
Norwegian tax data, but also show that similar features hold in the PSID.
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Percentage wealth in the top Percentage with 
negative or zero 
wealth
1% 5% 20% 40% 60% 80%
U.S. data
2.6% .72 28 49 75 89 96 99 6
AR(1) – Huggett (1996)
2.8% .72 12 35 74 93 99 100 14
Richer earnings process – De Nardi et al. (2016)
2.7% .65 10 30 67 88 96 99.6 5
De Nardi et al. (2016) reappraise this question by studying the implications of a rich earnings process, consistent with 
the one estimated by Guvenen et al. (2015a), in an otherwise standard life-cycle model. More speciﬁcally, they compare the 
wealth distribution generated by the model in the case in which earnings follow: (1) the AR(1) process used by Huggett 
(1996); or, alternatively, (2) the rich earnings process implied by the estimates in Guvenen et al. (2015a).12 Table 5 summa-
rizes their ﬁndings. The ﬁrst row refers to 1989 U.S. data from the SCF, while the second and third rows refer to the model 
with, respectively, Huggett’s (1996) AR(1) and the richer earnings process.
Allowing for richer earnings dynamics improves the ability of the model to match the wealth holdings of the poorest 
60% of the population. In particular, allowing for richer earnings dynamics dramatically improves the ability of the model 
to match the proportion of individuals with zero or little wealth. De Nardi et al. (2016) show that the main driver for this 
result is that the richer earnings process implies conditional moments that change with the previous earnings realization. 
In particular, the persistence of low earnings realizations is substantially below the average degree persistence. As a result, 
the richer earnings process implies that low-earning individuals engage in more precautionary saving relative to the AR(1) 
process.
Turning to the right tail of the wealth distribution, though, despite the fact that the richer earnings process matches the 
degree of negative skewness in the data, this richer earnings process implies a degree of top wealth concentration similar 
to that implied by the AR(1). That is, the richest 1% hold only about 10% of total wealth, compared with at least 28% in 
the data. This ﬁnding suggests that, even when considering tax data, which should be representative also of individuals 
at the top of the earnings distribution, the degree of skewness in the earnings data is not suﬃcient to generate enough 
precautionary saving by the rich to match the observed wealth at the top.
An important caveat, however, is that the tax data used by Guvenen et al. (2015a) do not contain business income in 
privately held businesses and thus might not capture the income of business owners/entrepreneurs, which account for 60% 
of individuals in the top 1% of the wealth distribution. DeBacker et al. (2012) use a conﬁdential panel of U.S. income tax 
returns for 1987–2009 to measure business income risks and document that, compared with labor income, business income 
is much riskier (even conditional on staying in business), less persistent over time, and characterized by higher probabilities 
of extreme upward or downward mobility. They also show that high-income entrepreneurs are more likely to face tail risk at 
both ends of the business income distribution. Both of these ﬁndings are generally consistent with the idea that high earners 
are subject to larger ﬂuctuations. Parker and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) also ﬁnd that incomes at the top are cyclical because 
of the labor component and bonuses, in particular. Although for business owners the split between their wages and capital 
income might be somewhat ﬂexible, these authors write “High-income households (top 1 percent) earn more than half of 
their non-capital gains income from wage income, and their wage income is far more exposed to aggregate ﬂuctuations 
than that of lower-income households...we ﬁnd even higher income exposure to aggregate ﬂuctuations for high-income 
households (top 0.01 percent) than for low-income households...”.
Interestingly, Barnett and Panousi (2015) also uncover that the risk faced by business people is heteroskedastic: high-
wealth agents are more likely than low-wealth agents to have big business-income ﬂuctuations (both big increases and big 
declines). In contrast, these “risks” do not vary along other dimensions, such as gender, level of education, and race.
One more caveat is in order. A substantial fraction of business income likely constitutes remuneration for the en-
trepreneur’s skill (labor earnings from the perspective of the model), rather than return on the owner’s capital investment 
(capital return). But in the absence of an appropriate criterion to apportion a share of business income to labor earnings, it is 
not clear how the properties of business owners’ income measured by DeBacker et al. (2012) should inform the calibration 
of labor earnings processes.
6.1. Interesting potential extensions
De Nardi et al. (2016) show that earnings data for non-entrepreneurs do not feature suﬃcient downward risk to gen-
erate a long right-tail in the wealth distribution as a result of precautionary saving. To the extent that this kind of risk is 
conﬁned to entrepreneurs or business owners, it should not just be modeled as an exogenous shock, but should, rather, 
12 In both cases they calibrate the discount factor to match a target wealth-income ratio of 3 in the data.
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Fig. 4. Savings after age 74, by age and permanent income quintile (HRS data). From De Nardi et al. (2010).
be endogenous to entrepreneurial decisions about savings, labor hiring, and portfolio choice. It would be interesting to use 
the new and more detailed data on the risks faced by entrepreneurs to formalize and estimate a model that matches the 
earnings, and rate of return dynamics and heterogeneity, associated with entrepreneurial activity, and study its implications 
for wealth inequality among both entrepreneurs and the whole population.
7. Medical expenses
De Nardi et al. (2010) use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data and ﬁnd that after retirement, out-of-pocket 
medical, including nursing home, costs rise with age and permanent income (PI). Fig. 3 shows that, especially after age 
80, out-of-pocket medical expenses increase fast by age for people in the highest PI quintile and, in particular, can surpass 
$20,000 a year after age 95.
They also ﬁnd that, during retirement, the elderly with the high PI dissave little until very advanced ages, the low PI 
elderly never save, while the middle PI elderly do dissave. More speciﬁcally, Fig. 4 displays median assets, conditional on 
birth cohort and permanent income quintile, for singles (who tend to have lower assets than couples). It presents asset 
proﬁles for the unbalanced panel, each point displaying the median for all the members of a particular cell who are alive 
at a particular date. Median assets are increasing in permanent income, with the 74-year-olds in the highest PI quintile 
holding median assets of about $200,000 and those in the lowest PI quintiles holding essentially no assets at all. Over time, 
those with the highest PI tend to hold onto signiﬁcant wealth well into their nineties, those with the lower PIs never save 
much, while those in the middle PIs display some asset decumulation as they age.
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They build a model of savings and medical expenses after retirement in which, consistent with the data, people with 
higher PIs also have longer life expectancies. Thus, compared with our Bewley models, preferences are heterogeneous be-
cause survival probabilities are heterogeneous by PI, hence, the effective discount factor, given by the product of β and sti
are heterogeneous, where sti indexes individual heterogeneity in survival probabilities. In addition, there is also a modiﬁ-
cation to the basic model’s technology. More speciﬁcally, medical expenses hit the budget constraint (as in Hubbard et al., 
1995 and 1994) as an exogenous shock to resources. The budget constraint is thus modiﬁed as follows
at+1 = (1+ r)at + yt −mt, a ≥ a,
where mt is the out-of-pocket medical expenses shock. In addition, the government provides a consumption ﬂoor.
Fig. 5 shows that the model with medical expenses ﬁts the savings data after age 74, by age and PI well. Medical ex-
penses that increase with age and permanent income are an important reason why the high PI elderly do not run down their 
assets, while government insurance covers the low PI households, who never save during retirement. Thus, based on their 
work, medical expenses (including for long-term care) and government insurance programs have large and heterogeneous
effects on savings.
Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014) separately allow for medical and nursing-home expenditure risk during retirement and 
consider their effect on saving over the whole life cycle rather than only after retirement. They ﬁnd that the risk associated 
with nursing-home expenses is more persistent than that for medical expenses and can account for 3 per cent of aggregate 
wealth, with half of the total effect accruing pre-retirement.
Lockwood (2016) ﬁnds that both medical and nursing-home expenses, and luxury-type bequests are important to un-
derstand the prevalence both of low dissaving rates and low rates of long-term care insurance coverage among wealthier 
retirees. Intuitively, a luxury-type bequests motive not only signiﬁcantly increases saving by richer individuals as in De 
Nardi (2004), it also signiﬁcantly reduces the demand for insurance against late-life risk by lowering the opportunity cost 
of precautionary saving.
Thus, modeling these forces is an important avenue for future research to better understand their effects on wealth 
inequality at all ages.
7.1. Interesting potential extensions
It would be interesting to evaluate the role of uncertain medical expenses at all stages of the life cycle and their impli-
cations in terms of wealth inequality. De Nardi et al. (2016) study the effects of the costs of bad health over the whole life 
cycle, but do not focus on the implications of medical costs on wealth inequality at all ages and in the cross-section.
8. Heterogeneity in rates of return
The standard Bewley model assumes that all individuals are confronted with a common risk-free rate of return on saving. 
Yet, there is evidence that rates of return are heterogeneous and often quite risky.
Earlier attempts to estimate the degree of heterogeneity in rates of return are by Flavin and Yamashita (2002), who 
compare the risk and return on housing to those of various asset categories and portfolios. Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002) ﬁnd that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity in the 1990s, while 
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period between 1999 and 2007.
More recently, Bach et al. (2015) evaluate the portfolios of wealthy households in Sweden and ﬁnd that yearly returns 
to ﬁnancial wealth are on average 4% higher for households in the top 1% of the wealth distribution, compared with the 
median household, but that these high average returns are primarily compensations for higher levels of systematic risk. 
Work by Fagereng et al. (2016) uses high-quality Norwegian tax data and also provides evidence of substantial heterogeneity 
in individual returns to wealth. In particular, they document: (a) a spread of 500 basis between the 10th and the 90th 
percentile of the distribution of returns; and (b) that heterogeneity holds within asset classes, rather than just being the 
result of a different portfolio mix between safe and risky assets.
The possibility that rates of return to wealth accumulation are subject to random idiosyncratic shocks has important 
implications for the dynamics of wealth inequality and wealth concentration. Stochastic rates of return change the technol-
ogy (and more speciﬁcally the stochastic process for factor returns) in our model economy and imply that the process for 
individual wealth accumulation,
at+1 = (1+ r it )at + yt − ct,
has an idiosyncratic, stochastic growth component rit , where i indexes individuals. It is well known since the work of 
Champernowne (1953) that (proportional) random growth processes imply, under appropriate regularity conditions, a long 
(Pareto) right tail. While the early contributions were purely statistical and assumed that consumption was an exogenous 
constant fraction of wealth, work by Benhabib et al. (2011, 2015), Aoki and Nirei (2016), and Gabaix et al. (2016) have 
extended this result to micro-founded models of consumption and savings.
Benhabib et al. (2016) conduct a quantitative exploration of the extent to which idiosyncratic rates of return, skewed 
earnings risk, and luxury bequest motives account for both the U.S. cross-sectional wealth distribution and its inter-
generational wealth mobility. They structurally estimate their model and ﬁnd that idiosyncratic rates of return contribute 
to top wealth concentration but are not suﬃcient to explain it. In fact, they show that saving and bequest behavior that 
increase with wealth (as generated by a luxury bequest motive) are both necessary and quantitatively more important to 
account for top wealth inequality.13 Idiosyncratic rates of return are, however, crucial to explain social mobility, in particular 
by speeding up downward mobility.







at + yt .
The extent to which the proportional growth rate term (1 + rit − ct/at) is persistent, rather than i.i.d., across individu-
als (type-dependence) or increasing in wealth (scale-dependence) generates positive feedback, respectively, from luck and 
wealth levels. Higher saving rates for wealth-rich individuals—i.e., ct/at decreasing in wealth—are one such mechanism. 
Scale dependence may also work through higher rates of return for wealthier people.14 Type-dependence, effectively highly 
persistent differences in idiosyncratic rates of return, provide a similar amplifying mechanism. Wälde (2016) calibrates the 
degree of ex-ante heterogeneity in the distribution of rates of return to match the evolution of the wealth distribution of 
the NLSY79 cohort between 1986 and 2008.
Gabaix et al. (2016) show that either scale or type-dependence is necessary for random growth models to account not 
only for top wealth concentration but also for the speed of change of wealth concentration observed in the data. In their 
absence, the speed of transition of this class of models is extremely slow. Interestingly, Bach et al. (2015) ﬁnd evidence of 
scale dependence, while Fagereng et al. (2016) ﬁnd evidence of both scale- and type-dependence—i.e., across current rate of 
return, level and type of education, and access to private equity.
8.1. Interesting potential extensions
In summary, persistent heterogeneity in rates of return is an important mechanism that generates at least some of 
the wealth inequality that we observe. Rates of return, however, are often the result of individual choices, knowledge, 
and ability. For instance, for entrepreneurs they are endogenous to the decision to start a business, to the amount saved, 
and to the share of wealth invested in the business. For investors, the rate of return is the result of their saving and 
portfolio choices, including housing. Lusardi et al. (2017) show that heterogeneity in rates of return driven by endogenous 
differences in ﬁnancial knowledge can account for 30 to 40 percent of wealth inequality. Among the models studying 
portfolio choice and wealth inequality, Kacperczyk et al. (2015) quantitatively evaluate portfolio choice in the presence of 
endogenous information acquisition and heterogeneity in investor sophistication and asset riskiness. They show that an 
13 Dynan et al. (2004) and Saez and Zucman (2014) document that the rich do save at higher rates.
14 In Kaplan et al. (2016), returns on wealth are increasing in wealth due to a ﬁxed cost of portfolio adjustment for high-return illiquid assets. In 
conjunction with a perpetual youth demographic, which generates a number of individuals with very long life spans, the model generates a long top 
wealth tail.
294 M. De Nardi, G. Fella / Review of Economic Dynamics 26 (2017) 280–300improvement in the aggregate technology to process information can explain the observed increase in wealth concentration 
among investors since 1990.15
This raises the important question of how rates of return, particularly at the top of the wealth distribution, are deter-
mined. More work is needed to shed additional light on the key determinants of the rates of return to one’s wealth and 
their role in generating wealth inequality. We now turn to the study of entrepreneurship as an important determinant of 
rates of return and inequality in wealth holdings.
9. Entrepreneurship
Quadrini (1999), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), Buera (2006), and De Nardi et al. (2007) argue that entrepreneurship is a 
key element generating wealth concentration among the richest households.16 Below, we present some data indicating that 
this is the case, but to identify what an entrepreneur is in the data, let us ﬁrst see what an entrepreneur is in the model 
that we adopt.
Quadrini (1999) was the ﬁrst to study the interaction between entrepreneurship and saving behavior by introducing an 
endogenous entrepreneurial choice in a Bewley model. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) build on his contribution. They build 
a model of entrepreneurship with perfectly altruistic, ﬁnitely-lived agents who are endowed with two types of abilities—as 
a worker and as an entrepreneur—and with an entrepreneurial production function that endogenizes the rate of return to 
being an entrepreneur.
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)’s model has the following key elements. Completely altruistic agents care about their chil-
dren and face uncertainty about their time of death. Thus, they leave both accidental and voluntary bequests. There are 
two stages of life, the model period is one year, agents age stochastically from the ﬁrst to the second stage and then die 
stochastically. An agent that dies is replaced by an offspring that inherits assets and business, if there is one, and whose 
abilities are correlated to those of the deceased parent. Every period, the young agents observe their ability for the period 
both as a worker and as an entrepreneur, form expectations about their future realizations, and decide whether to run a 
business or work for a wage.
The entrepreneurial production function is given by
f (k) = θkν + (1− δ)k,
where k is working capital, θ is entrepreneurial ability, ν is the degree of decreasing returns to scale, and δ is depreciation. 
Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) generalize the entrepreneurial production function to labor hiring.
Borrowing constraints imply that
k = a + b(a),
where a is one’s assets and b(a) is borrowing as a function of one’s assets.17
An important issue is how one identiﬁes entrepreneurs in the data given the deﬁnition of entrepreneur adopted in 
the model. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) use the SCF and classify as entrepreneurs those households who declare being 
self-employed, owning a privately held business (or a share of one), and having an active management role in it. According 
to this deﬁnition, which is consistent with the one in the model that they use, entrepreneurs constitute a small fraction of 
the population (about 8%) but hold a large share of total net worth (about 40%). They show that, in the data, entrepreneurs 
constitute a large fraction of rich people.
Table 6, from their paper, shows that, not only the total net worth held by the top percentiles (ﬁrst row), but also the 
percentage of entrepreneurs in a given wealth percentile (second row) and the percentage of wealth within that percentile 
that is owned by entrepreneurs (third row) are all very high. For example, among the richest 1% of people in terms of net 
worth, 63% are entrepreneurs, and they hold 68% of the total wealth held by the wealthiest 1% of people (who hold 30% of 
total net worth). They also show that alternative classiﬁcations of entrepreneurship give similar results.
In Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)’s calibration, the optimal ﬁrm size is large and the entrepreneur is borrowing constrained. 
Thus, entrepreneurs, even when rich, want to keep saving to grow their ﬁrm to be able to borrow more and reap higher 
returns from capital. This is the mechanism that, in this framework, keeps the rich entrepreneurs’ saving rate high and 
generates high wealth concentration.
15 Somewhat related, Mengus and Pancrazi (2016) extend Aiyagari (1994) by allowing individuals to choose to access a complete asset market at a ﬁxed 
cost instead of investing only in a risk-free asset. They show that for parameter conﬁgurations implying a non-degenerate distribution of agents over both 
markets, wealth inequality can be substantially higher than if the equilibrium features only investment in the risk-free asset.
16 Quadrini (2009) surveys the factors affecting the decision to become an entrepreneur and the aggregate and distributional implications of entrepreneur-
ship for savings and investment.
17 The notation does not allow for dependence on all the state variables. In the formulation adopted in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), b(a) is actually a 
function of all of the state variables in the economy and this outcome arises endogenously from the assumption that contracts are imperfectly enforceable 
and that lenders take the imperfect enforceability of contracts into account when deciding how much to lend (as in Cooley et al., 2004 and Kehoe and 
Levine, 1993). Besides being more micro-founded, these kind of borrowing constraints also have the advantage of endogenously responding to economic 
conditions such as changing wages and interest rates (see Bassetto et al., 2014, for an illustration and a discussion of this mechanism applied to the Great 
Recession). However, simpler kinds of borrowing constraints, such as linear functions of one’s assets, make for models that are easier and faster to solve, 
and generate similar implications for cross-sectional wealth inequality at one point in time. For an application of the classic case in which borrowing is a 
linear function of one’s assets in a model with wealth inequality and entrepreneurship, see Kitao (2008) and Meh (2005).
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Entrepreneurs and the distribution of wealth (SCF 1989). From Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
Top % 1 5 10 20
Whole population
Percentage of total net worth held 30 54 67 81
Entrepreneurs
Percentage of households in a given percentile 63 49 39 28
Percentage of net worth held in a given percentile 68 58 53 47
Table 7





Percentage wealth in the top
1% 5% 20% 40%
Baseline model with entrepreneurs
0.8 7.50% 31 60 83 94
Fig. 6. Saving rate for highest-ability workers. Solid line: with high entrepreneurial ability; dash–dot line: with no entrepreneurial ability; vertical line: asset 
level at which high-entrepreneurial-ability individuals enter entrepreneurship. From Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
In order to compare buffer-stock saving behavior with entrepreneurial saving behavior, Fig. 6 compares the saving rates 
(deﬁned as assets in a given period minus assets in the previous period, divided by total income during the period) for 
people who have the highest ability level as workers during the current period. The solid line refers to the people who 
draw the high entrepreneurial ability level during the current period, while the dash–dotted line refers to those who get 
the low entrepreneurial ability draw. Given the same asset level (and potential earnings as workers), agents with high en-
trepreneurial ability have a much higher saving rate while workers, with no entrepreneurial ability, display pure buffer-stock 
saving behavior.
Agents with high entrepreneurial ability become entrepreneurs only if their wealth is above a certain threshold, corre-
sponding to the vertical line in the ﬁgure. The saving rate of those with high entrepreneurial ability but who do not own 
enough assets to become entrepreneurs is higher than the one for agents without entrepreneurial ability. Intuitively, as 
ability is persistent, workers with high entrepreneurial ability save to have a chance to start a business in the future. In 
the region to the left of the threshold, the distance between the solid and the dash-dotted lines is solely due to the higher 
implicit rate of return from saving that one could obtain by becoming an entrepreneur in the future. All households with 
wealth in that range choose to be workers and earn the same income. Yet, the desire to become entrepreneurs generates a 
higher saving rate for agents with high entrepreneurial ability.
The saving rate of those with high entrepreneurial ability and enough assets to become entrepreneurs (in the region to 
the right of the threshold) is positive and considerably higher than that of workers. The return on entrepreneurial activity 
is high, and the entrepreneur would like to increase the size of the ﬁrm by borrowing capital. However, the borrowing 
constraint limits the size of the ﬁrm and entrepreneurs must partly self-ﬁnance any additional investment. Therefore, the 
combination of higher returns from the business together with the budget constraint generates a high saving rate for 
entrepreneurs. As the ﬁrm size expands, returns eventually decrease and so does the saving rate. (We truncate the axis of 
the graph for easier readability.)
Table 7 shows that the model is successful in generating a high degree of wealth concentration. A few things are worth 
mentioning. First, the distribution of wealth is not matched by construction in the calibration procedure. Second, the model’s 
296 M. De Nardi, G. Fella / Review of Economic Dynamics 26 (2017) 280–300implied returns to capital are not implausibly high and are within the range of those found by Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002) and Kartashova (2014). Third, the model generates entry probabilities as a function of one’s wealth that 
are consistent with those estimated by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) on micro-level data and also implies that inheritances are 
a strong predictor of business entry.
In a related contribution, Herranz et al. (2015) study the interaction of heterogeneity in risk aversion and entrepreneurial 
ﬁrm size, capital structure, and default to manage risk, but do not study their model’s implications for wealth inequality.
9.1. Interesting potential extensions
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)’s model imposes several important restrictions: the life-cycle structure is stylized, there is 
only one type of entrepreneurial production function, agents can either run their business or work for a ﬁrm, and they 
cannot get around the borrowing constraint by selling the ﬁrm or going public.
In contrast, the data point to large heterogeneity among entrepreneurs, including in the growth and development of 
their ﬁrm, in their aspirations, and in their attachment to working for a ﬁrm while they also operate their own business. 
Campbell and Nardi (2009) ﬁnd, for instance, that aspirations about the size of the ﬁrm that one would like to run are 
different for men and women, and that many people who are trying to start a business also work for an employer and thus 
work long hours in total. Hence, many people get their business started while still working as an employee.
It would be interesting to generalize Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)’s model to allow for heterogeneity in entrepreneurial 
production functions. Given the data on time allocation, it would also be worthwhile to think more about the time allocation 
decision between working for an employer, starting and running one’s ﬁrm, and home production. The challenge would be 
to convincingly take the additional richness in the model to the data, but this heterogeneity is clearly important for a 
number of questions, including the effects of taxation and government support programs on various types of entrepreneurs.
Extending Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)’s framework to a richer life-cycle structure would allow us to better understand 
the timing and trade-offs of being an entrepreneur or a worker over the life cycle and to compare them for men and women 
who, in the data, also differ in their likelihood of entering entrepreneurship by age (Campbell and Nardi, 2009). Women 
might, for instance, enter entrepreneurship later, during their child-rearing years, seeking a more convenient and ﬂexible 
occupation, rather than an enterprise with a potentially high rate of return.
Finally, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) does not allow for ﬁrms to be sold or for an explicit decision to go public. Under-
standing the life cycle of ﬁrms, the degree to which they are borrowing constrained as they mature, and the decision to 
go public or sell one’s ﬁrm is important and also deserves more investigation. Glover and Short (2015) study the interplay 
between entrepreneurial risks and the decisions to incorporate and to go bankrupt. Chari et al. (2004) study the role of 
capital gains taxation on business start-up and on the sale of one’s ﬁrm to professional managers. None of these papers, 
however, focus on their model’s implications for wealth inequality.
10. Lessons learned and directions for future research
Basic versions of the Bewley model miss key aspects of saving behavior and, in particular, the saving behavior of the 
rich. They also overstate the importance of precautionary savings due to earnings risk, because they do not allow for the 
presence of any other risks or other reasons to save.
Reviewing the previous contributions, this survey ﬁnds that explicitly modeling the life cycle18 and the transmission 
of human capital and bequests across generations, entrepreneurship, and medical expenses is key to understanding saving 
and wealth inequality. These forces, however, have mostly been studied in isolation, which makes it diﬃcult to establish 
their relative importance. For this reason, we argue that a rich model including these forces should be developed. As the 
model’s richness grows, more aspects of the data, in addition to wealth inequality, need to be compared with the model’s 
implications, to disentangle the strength and importance of the various saving motives. These additional moments should 
include wealth mobility, both within and across generations, for both entrepreneurs and workers, portfolio composition, the 
marginal propensity to consume and bequeath out of an additional dollar, and the correlation between lifetime earnings 
and wealth at retirement.
This survey concludes by mentioning other important economic forces that so far have not been examined in the context 
of quantitative models of wealth inequality and that are potentially important for future research. They include modeling 
the family, endogenizing wages and human capital, endogenizing health, better measuring and understanding idiosyncratic 
risk, and endogenizing rates of return from assets.
First, most people are in families. Importantly, this exposes them to their own risks and their partner’s risks (earnings, 
medical expenses, death, and divorce), but provides them with the ability to self-insure using the labor supply of both 
partners and savings. Blundell et al. (2012) highlight the importance of family labor supply as an insurance mechanism 
for wage shocks and ﬁnd strong evidence of smoothing of permanent shocks to wages. Doepke and Tertilt (2016) discuss 
the importance of families in macroeconomics more broadly. Attanasio et al. (2015) and Borella et al. (2016) focus on 
risk-sharing within the family, but not on the implications for wealth inequality. Given that a signiﬁcant portion of wealth 
18 See also Krueger et al. (2016).
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model these mechanisms and to understand their effects on wealth inequality.
Second, it is important to jointly model the determinants and dynamics of both earnings and wealth over the life cycle by 
allowing for endogenous human capital accumulation, in addition to savings. Huggett et al. (2006) show that a benchmark 
model of human capital can replicate mean earnings and measures of earnings dispersion and skewness over the working 
life cycle observed in the data. Huggett et al. (2011) ﬁnd that, in a model of risky human capital, as of age 23, differences 
in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime earnings, lifetime wealth, and lifetime utility than do 
differences in shocks received over the working lifetime. These ﬁndings raise the question of what are the implications of 
human capital and how its accumulation interacts with that of wealth, both over the life cycle and in the cross-section.
Third, it is essential to understand the role of health dynamics and medical expenses in determining labor supply, 
earnings, and savings. De Nardi et al. (2010) show that medical expenses and lifespan heterogeneity that are heterogeneous
by income quintiles are important to explain saving behavior by wealth quintile during old age. It would be interesting 
to embed medical expenses in a full life-cycle model and analyze their implications for wealth inequality. Going one step 
backwards, one should think about the determinants of health and medical expenditures and ideally model jointly inequality 
in health, wealth, and medical expenses over all of the life cycle.
Fourth, the importance of the nature of idiosyncratic risk assumed in these models also raises the question of its mea-
surement in the data. What we, as economists, measure as a shock in the data might be anticipated by the households. 
This might be especially true for administrative data sets that contain little information about the household (in contrast 
with survey data, which instead, might contain information on households’ health, divorce, and expectations). Sabelhaus and 
Ackerman (2012) use SCF data to derive the gap between actual and “normal” income from survey questions and use it as a 
measure of shocks. This approach stands in contrast to existing income shock measures in the literature, which are generally 
derived from the residuals of estimated earnings or income equations. Interestingly, the overall variance and asymmetry of 
shocks over the business cycle derived from this analysis are similar to those of existing residual-based estimates. Blundell 
et al. (2008) use data on both consumption and income to draw inference on the persistence of income shocks. More work 
is needed to better disentangle the actual shocks that households face and their sources.
Fifth, while heterogeneity in rates of return plays some role in generating wealth inequality, as shown by Benhabib et 
al. (2016), and while there is evidence that rates of return are heterogeneous, it is important to recognize that they are 
endogenous and dependent on occupational choice or entrepreneurship and portfolio choice. Much more work is needed, 
to determine what gives rise to the heterogeneity in rates of return that we observe and how it interacts with wealth 
accumulation and wealth inequality.
It is important to note that understanding these mechanisms is also crucial from the standpoint of studying the impli-
cations of different government policies. More speciﬁcally, different mechanisms may give rise to similar observed wealth 
concentrations but have vastly different policy implications. For instance, modeling entrepreneurship often implies that the 
adverse responses of savings and economic activity to increased taxation are signiﬁcant, and especially so if taxation affects 
the returns to running a business (Kitao, 2008; Lee, 2015, and Cagetti and De Nardi, 2009). In contrast, in a model with 
high earnings risk for the top earners, Kindermann and Krueger (2015) conclude that the optimal marginal income tax rate 
is close to 90%. The big difference in responses to taxation between these models is due to the fact that entrepreneurs’ 
savings and investments are responsive to their implicit rate of return, net of taxes. In contrast, individuals with very high 
labor earnings facing a large probability of a very large fall in earnings next period have very high incentives to engage in 
precautionary saving. Hence, when an increase in labor taxation reduces their net earnings, they still save at a high rate, 
as long as expected net income tomorrow is suﬃciently low compared with today’s net earnings. This stark contrast in 
policy implications stemming from different motivations to save points to the importance of understanding whether, for 
instance, the risk that the rich face comes from the return on their human capital as opposed to the return on the wealth 
they have invested in their business. More work needs to be done to more conclusively determine the effects of taxation in 
quantitative models of wealth inequality.
Finally, in this survey, we focus on the determinants of inequality at a point in time, but more work is needed to un-
derstand the dynamics of inequality and its determinants over time.19 For some work on the evolution of wealth inequality 
over time, see Hubmer et al. (2016), Kaymak and Poschke (2016), and Gabaix et al. (2016).
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